RTI on Corruption Complaints Against Supreme Court and High Court Judges: Can Judicial Accountability Be Kept Outside the Right to Information Act?
The question of transparency in the Indian judiciary has entered an important legal debate: Can citizens use the Right to Information Act, 2005, to find out whether complaints of corruption or misconduct have been received against a particular Supreme Court or High Court judge, and what action has been taken on those complaints?
A recent development before the Delhi High Court in Saurav Das v. CPIO, Supreme Court of India has brought this question into sharp focus. The Supreme Court administration has maintained that it does not keep judge-specific information about corruption and misconduct complaints in the format requested. It has also raised objections concerning confidentiality, personal information and the resources required to compile such information.
The dispute raises a fundamental question about the relationship between two important democratic principles: the independence and reputation of the judiciary, and the public’s right to know how allegations of misconduct against holders of high constitutional offices are handled.
It is important, however, to distinguish between a court’s submission, a public information officer’s decision and a binding judicial judgment. The proceedings in this case should not be interpreted as having established a blanket legal rule that every complaint against every Supreme Court or High Court judge is exempt from disclosure under the RTI Act.
1. The Saurav Das Case: How the Dispute Began
The controversy originated from an RTI application filed by journalist and RTI activist Saurav Das on 25 April 2023.
Das approached the Central Public Information Officer (CPIO) of the Supreme Court of India seeking information concerning former Madras High Court judge Justice T. Raja, who had also served as Acting Chief Justice of the Madras High Court.
His application sought three specific categories of information:
- Whether the Chief Justice of India, the Supreme Court Collegium or the Supreme Court had received any complaints alleging corruption or improper conduct against Justice T. Raja during his tenure.
- If such complaints had been received, the total number of complaints and the dates on which they were received.
- What action had been taken by the competent authorities on those complaints or representations.
The request was significant because it did not initially seek a detailed copy of every complaint or the personal information of the complainants. Instead, it sought information about the existence, number and handling of complaints concerning a particular judge.
On 17 May 2023, the Supreme Court’s CPIO rejected the request with a short response:
“The information is not maintained in the manner as sought for.”
The applicant subsequently approached the First Appellate Authority. However, the appeal was dismissed on 22 June 2023, with the authority agreeing that the CPIO’s response was appropriate.
Thereafter, Das approached the Central Information Commission (CIC), challenging the refusal.
Central Information Commission’s Decision
On 7 October 2024, the CIC, headed by Chief Information Commissioner Heeralal Samariya, passed an important order.
The Commission directed the Supreme Court’s CPIO to reconsider the first two questions and provide the number of complaints, if such information was maintained in the records. If it was not maintained, the CPIO was required to inform the applicant accordingly.
However, regarding the third question concerning action taken on the complaints, the CIC considered the information to be personal information exempt under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act as it concerned an individual and the applicant was not the complainant.
This distinction is particularly important.
The CIC did not simply declare that all information about complaints against judges was inaccessible. It specifically directed reconsideration of the statistical information while treating the requested action-taken information differently.
The subsequent proceedings before the Delhi High Court arose from the continuing dispute over access to this information.
2. Delhi High Court Proceedings in 2026: Supreme Court’s Position
The matter was brought before the Delhi High Court in the writ petition titled Saurav Das v. CPIO, Supreme Court of India, W.P.(C) 7342/2025.
The proceedings became particularly important during the hearing on 1 April 2026.
The Supreme Court administration informed the Delhi High Court that it did not maintain judge-specific information concerning complaints of corruption or misconduct.
The administration also distinguished between the aggregate number of complaints furnished to the Government for presentation before Parliament and the information sought by the petitioner concerning a particular judge.
According to the Supreme Court’s position, the aggregate figures supplied to Parliament did not mean that the institution maintained a corresponding judge-wise database.
The administration further argued that compiling the requested information could involve considerable effort and divert disproportionate resources.
It relied upon Section 7(9) of the RTI Act in support of its objection concerning the form and burden of supplying the information.
Another important argument concerned confidentiality. The Supreme Court’s counsel maintained that complaints may contain sensitive allegations, supporting documents and information that are not in the public domain.
The administration also distinguished between complaints that merely reach the institution and complaints that receive the attention of the Chief Justice of India and become part of an inquiry or institutional process.
This distinction is central to understanding the controversy.
A complaint being received does not automatically mean that the allegations are established, that an inquiry has been initiated, or that misconduct has been proved.
Petitioner’s Arguments
Advocate Prashant Bhushan, appearing for Saurav Das, challenged the reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court administration.
His principal argument was that allegations concerning corruption or misconduct by a constitutional judicial office-holder cannot automatically be classified as purely personal information.
According to the petitioner’s position, such allegations have a direct connection with public functions, institutional integrity and public confidence in the judiciary.
He also referred to the information already supplied to Parliament concerning the total number of complaints received by the CJI’s office.
The petitioner argued that when the institution maintains aggregate complaint figures, it should also be possible to identify whether complaints were received against a particular judge.
He further argued that even if compiling information in a particular format would be difficult, the applicant should be allowed to inspect the relevant existing records, subject to legitimate confidentiality restrictions.
The petitioner also relied on the public authority’s obligations under Section 4 of the RTI Act concerning proper maintenance and accessibility of records.
An important point raised during the proceedings was that the applicant was not necessarily seeking copies of every confidential document. He was seeking basic information about whether complaints existed and how the institution dealt with them.
What Did the Delhi High Court Do?
During the 1 April hearing, the Court asked both sides to suggest a possible mechanism that could protect the reputation of judges against frivolous complaints while ensuring public transparency in the handling of genuine allegations.
The matter was subsequently adjourned on 7 May 2026.
According to the available court record, arguments were heard on 5 November 2026, and the Delhi High Court reserved its order.
Therefore, as of 11 November 2026, the final decision in the writ petition should not be described as having been delivered.
The distinction matters: the Supreme Court administration’s submissions are not themselves a judicial ruling establishing that all complaints against judges are exempt from the RTI Act.
3. The RTI Act and Complaints Against Judges: Understanding the Legal Provisions
The dispute involves several provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005. Their correct interpretation is essential because an exemption from disclosure and the absence of an existing record are two legally different situations.
Section 8(1)(j): Personal Information
Section 8(1)(j) is one of the provisions relied upon in disputes concerning disclosure of personal information.
An important legal development occurred through the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023.
Section 44(3) of that legislation substituted the earlier wording of Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act with the following provision:
“Information which relates to personal information.”
This amendment came into force on 13 November 2025.
Consequently, the 2026 proceedings must be understood in the context of the amended provision, rather than relying exclusively on the older wording of Section 8(1)(j).
The Government has explained that the amendment seeks to balance the right to privacy with the right to information.
However, the existence of this provision does not automatically answer whether information concerning complaints about a judge’s official conduct must be withheld.
There remains an important distinction between:
- Personal information unrelated to the performance of public duties.
- Information concerning the exercise of constitutional and public responsibilities.
- Confidential material supplied by complainants.
- Institutional information concerning the receipt and handling of complaints.
These categories may require different legal treatment.
A complaint alleging corruption in the exercise of judicial office raises a different public-interest consideration from information about a judge’s private family life, personal correspondence or unrelated personal affairs.
Nevertheless, the nature of the information, the privacy interests involved and the applicable statutory exemptions must be examined before disclosure.
Section 8(1)(e): Information Held in a Fiduciary Relationship
Another provision relevant to the controversy is Section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act.
It protects information available to a person in their fiduciary relationship, unless the competent authority is satisfied that larger public interest justifies disclosure.
A fiduciary relationship generally involves a relationship of trust and confidence in which information is entrusted for a particular purpose.
The Supreme Court administration’s confidentiality argument raises the question of whether complaints and supporting material received through the judicial in-house mechanism can be treated as fiduciary or otherwise confidential information.
However, Section 8(1)(e) should not be interpreted as a blanket exemption covering every document or administrative fact held by a constitutional court.
For example, the mere fact that an institution received a complaint, the date of receipt, or the total number of complaints may raise different disclosure questions from the contents of a confidential complaint or an internal inquiry report.
The applicable exemption must be examined with reference to the particular information requested.
Section 7(9): Disproportionate Diversion of Resources
Section 7(9) has also become important in the Saurav Das proceedings.
This provision states that information should ordinarily be provided in the form in which it is sought, unless doing so would disproportionately divert the resources of the public authority or endanger the safety or preservation of the record.
A crucial legal distinction must be understood here:
Section 7(9) is not an independent exemption from disclosure under the RTI Act.
It deals primarily with the form in which information may be supplied.
For instance, a public authority may maintain thousands of documents in different files. If extracting and compiling a new, customised report would require substantial work, it may have grounds to refuse the particular format requested.
However, that does not automatically establish that all existing information can be withheld.
The public authority must distinguish between information that already exists and information that would have to be newly created through extensive analysis or compilation.
If relevant records already exist, the possibility of providing access to those records or permitting inspection may need to be considered.
This is especially important in the present case because the petitioner has argued that inspection of existing records could be an alternative to preparing a new database.
Section 8(2): The Larger Public Interest Override
Section 8(2) is another important provision.
It permits a public authority to disclose information notwithstanding the exemptions under Section 8(1), where the public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm to the protected interests.
This provision recognises that statutory exemptions are not necessarily absolute in every situation.
In a dispute concerning allegations of corruption or misconduct against a constitutional office-holder, the applicant may argue that disclosure serves a broader public purpose.
Relevant considerations may include:
- Accountability in the exercise of public office.
- Integrity of constitutional institutions.
- Public confidence in judicial administration.
- Prevention of institutional misconduct.
- Transparency in the handling of serious complaints.
On the other hand, disclosure must also take account of the rights of complainants, the reputation of judges, confidentiality of investigations and the danger of publishing unverified allegations.
The question is therefore not simply whether transparency is important or whether privacy deserves protection. It is how these competing interests should be balanced in each category of information.
4. The 8,630 Complaints: What Did the Government Tell Parliament?
One of the most significant developments in this controversy came on 13 February 2026, when the Union Government disclosed information in the Lok Sabha about complaints received by the Office of the Chief Justice of India against sitting Supreme Court and High Court judges.
The information was provided by Minister of State for Law and Justice Arjun Ram Meghwal in response to a parliamentary question raised by DMK MP V.S. Matheswaran.
According to the Government’s response, the CJI’s office received a total of 8,630 complaints between 2016 and 2025.
The annual figures were reported as follows:
| Year | Complaints received |
|---|---|
| 2016 | 729 |
| 2017 | 682 |
| 2018 | 717 |
| 2019 | 1,037 |
| 2020 | 518 |
| 2021 | 686 |
| 2022 | 1,012 |
| 2023 | 977 |
| 2024 | 1,170 |
| 2025 | 1,102 |
| Total | 8,630 |
The figures reveal that the highest annual number was recorded in 2024, when 1,170 complaints were received. The lowest was recorded in 2020, with 518 complaints.
However, these figures must be interpreted carefully.
They represent complaints received, not proven instances of corruption or misconduct. They do not establish that 8,630 separate allegations were substantiated, nor do they establish that all complaints concerned corruption.
The parliamentary question covered complaints relating to corruption, sexual misconduct and other serious impropriety.
The Missing Information: What Happened to These Complaints?
Although the Government disclosed the aggregate figures, the response did not provide a comprehensive account of the outcomes.
For example, the publicly reported response did not establish:
- How many complaints were found to be frivolous or baseless.
- How many complaints were considered serious.
- How many complaints resulted in preliminary examination.
- How many complaints led to a formal in-house inquiry.
- How many complaints resulted in recommendations for remedial action.
- How many complaints were closed without further action.
- How many complaints resulted in a judge resigning or facing any other institutional consequence.
These are important questions because the number of complaints received alone does not reveal how effectively an accountability mechanism operates.
A transparent institutional system should ideally be able to distinguish between complaints received, complaints examined, complaints found to have substance and complaints that resulted in action.
The absence of publicly available outcome information creates a legitimate debate about whether the present system provides sufficient institutional accountability.
At the same time, publishing the identities of judges against whom unverified complaints have been made could cause serious reputational damage.
The challenge is to make institutional accountability measurable without turning the complaint process into a public platform for unsubstantiated accusations.
5. How Are Complaints Against Supreme Court and High Court Judges Investigated?
India has a separate internal mechanism for dealing with complaints concerning the conduct of judges of the higher judiciary.
This mechanism is commonly known as the In-House Procedure.
It was adopted by the Supreme Court in a Full Court meeting held on 7 May 1997.
Two important resolutions were adopted:
- The Restatement of Values of Judicial Life.
- The In-House Procedure for taking suitable remedial action against judges who do not follow accepted standards of judicial conduct.
The purpose of this framework is to maintain judicial discipline and institutional integrity while protecting the independence of the judiciary.
Who Receives Complaints?
Under the established procedure:
- The Chief Justice of India is competent to receive complaints against Supreme Court judges.
- The Chief Justice of India is also competent to receive complaints against Chief Justices of High Courts.
- The Chief Justice of the concerned High Court is competent to receive complaints against judges of that High Court.
Complaints received through the Centralised Public Grievance Redress and Monitoring System (CPGRAMS) or other channels may be forwarded to the appropriate judicial authority.
What Happens After a Complaint Is Received?
The process is not equivalent to an ordinary criminal prosecution.
The competent judicial authority examines the complaint and determines whether it warrants further consideration.
Depending on the nature and seriousness of the allegations, the matter may proceed through an internal examination and, where appropriate, an investigative process involving other judges.
The Supreme Court has recognised the importance of the in-house mechanism in dealing with allegations against judges.
In Additional District and Sessions Judge ‘X’ v. Registrar General, High Court of Madhya Pradesh, the Supreme Court discussed the procedure for examining allegations against members of the higher judiciary.
The Court recognised that the process must consider the rights of both the complainant and the judge concerned while protecting the integrity of the judicial institution.
This is an important principle.
A complaint is an allegation, not proof. A judge should not be treated as guilty merely because somebody has submitted a representation against them.
Equally, a complaint should not be ignored merely because it concerns a member of the judiciary.
The internal mechanism is intended to address both concerns.
Is the In-House Procedure the Same as Impeachment?
No.
The in-house mechanism and the constitutional process for removing a judge are two different procedures.
The in-house mechanism deals with complaints and possible remedial or institutional action concerning judicial conduct.
The constitutional removal process is governed by Articles 124(4) and 217, read with the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968.
Removal of a Supreme Court judge or High Court judge requires a parliamentary process involving the constitutionally prescribed special majority in both Houses of Parliament, followed by an address to the President.
Therefore, an internal inquiry, an adverse finding or a recommendation for remedial action does not automatically mean that a judge has been removed from office.
This distinction is important when examining the effectiveness of judicial accountability in India.
6. Can the Judiciary Claim Complete Confidentiality Over Complaints?
This is one of the central legal questions arising from the controversy.
There are legitimate reasons for maintaining confidentiality in the initial stages of complaints against judges.
First, complaints may contain allegations that have not been independently verified.
Second, public disclosure of unsubstantiated allegations could damage the reputation of an innocent judge.
Third, complainants may have legitimate privacy and safety concerns.
Fourth, preliminary inquiries may require confidentiality to prevent interference with the investigation or the destruction of relevant evidence.
However, confidentiality of an inquiry does not necessarily mean that every piece of information about the existence and administration of complaints must remain confidential indefinitely.
There is a difference between disclosing the contents of an unverified complaint and disclosing institutional statistics concerning how complaints are handled.
For example, the following information may raise different legal considerations:
| Information requested | Principal legal consideration |
|---|---|
| Total complaints received annually | Institutional statistics and transparency |
| Whether a complaint exists against a particular judge | Privacy, reputation and public interest |
| Name and identity of complainant | Personal privacy and protection |
| Contents of an unverified complaint | Confidentiality and reputational harm |
| Whether a preliminary examination occurred | Institutional accountability and confidentiality |
| Final findings of an inquiry | Public interest, privacy and applicable rules |
| General action taken on complaints | Accountability and possible disclosure with redactions |
This distinction could be particularly important in deciding the Saurav Das petition.
A public authority should not necessarily have to disclose the complete contents of a confidential complaint merely because a citizen asks whether a complaint exists.
Equally, the confidentiality of the contents should not automatically settle the question of whether aggregate information or appropriately redacted institutional records can be disclosed.
The legal answer may differ depending on the type of information sought.
7. Supreme Court’s Landmark RTI Judgment: CPIO, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal
An important legal background to the present dispute is the Supreme Court’s Constitution Bench judgment in Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal, delivered on 13 November 2019.
This judgment examined the relationship between the Right to Information Act, judicial independence, privacy and institutional transparency.
One of the important questions concerned whether the office of the Chief Justice of India came within the scope of the RTI Act.
The Supreme Court upheld the position that the office of the CJI is a public authority under the RTI Act.
The judgment recognised that the judiciary is not outside the transparency framework merely because it is an independent constitutional institution.
At the same time, the Court explained that transparency must operate consistently with legitimate privacy interests, confidentiality and judicial independence.
The judgment also dealt with the disclosure of judges’ asset declarations.
The Court upheld disclosure of information concerning which Supreme Court judges had declared their assets to the CJI, while recognising that the contents of personal asset declarations could raise separate privacy concerns.
This judgment is relevant to the Saurav Das dispute for an important reason.
It demonstrates that judicial independence does not automatically place the Supreme Court administration beyond the RTI Act.
However, it also does not establish that every document concerning a judge must be disclosed.
The appropriate legal approach is to examine the nature of the information, the applicable exemption and the public interest in disclosure.
The distinction between institutional accountability and personal privacy is therefore central to the present controversy.
8. Does Section 4 of the RTI Act Require Systematic Maintenance of Complaints?
Another important aspect of the dispute concerns Section 4(1)(a) of the RTI Act.
This provision requires every public authority to maintain its records duly catalogued and indexed, in a manner and form that facilitates the right to information.
It also encourages computerisation of appropriate records.
The purpose is to ensure that public authorities do not operate in a manner that makes information unnecessarily difficult to access.
In the Saurav Das proceedings, the petitioner relied on the principle that records relating to complaints should be maintained in a way that facilitates public accountability.
The Supreme Court administration, on the other hand, maintained that it did not keep the requested information in a judge-specific format.
This creates an important distinction between two questions.
First: Does the RTI Act require a public authority to create a new database or compile information that it does not maintain?
Generally, the RTI Act provides access to information that already exists or is held under the control of a public authority. It does not ordinarily require an authority to create new information, draw new conclusions or undertake extensive research to answer an application.
Second: Does the RTI Act require public authorities to maintain their records properly?
Yes. Section 4 establishes record-management obligations intended to facilitate access to information.
These two principles must be read together.
A public authority cannot automatically be required to create a completely new database whenever an applicant makes a request. However, it must also consider its statutory record-management obligations and cannot treat the absence of a customised report as proof that no relevant underlying records exist.
In this case, the issue is particularly significant because the petitioner has argued that inspection of existing records could provide an alternative to preparing a new compilation.
The Court’s eventual decision could help clarify the relationship between the right to access existing records and the obligation to maintain records in an accessible manner.
9. What Does This Controversy Mean for Judicial Accountability in India?
The Saurav Das case is not merely a dispute about an RTI application. It raises broader questions about how accountability should function within one of India’s most important constitutional institutions.
The judiciary occupies a distinctive position in India’s constitutional framework. It protects fundamental rights, interprets legislation, reviews government action and resolves disputes involving citizens, institutions and the State.
Judicial independence is essential to these responsibilities.
However, judicial independence and institutional accountability are not mutually exclusive principles.
A judge must be protected from political pressure, intimidation, malicious allegations and attempts to influence judicial decisions. At the same time, the public has a legitimate interest in understanding whether credible allegations of misconduct are examined through a fair and effective institutional process.
The challenge is to develop a system that protects both principles.
The Problem of Institutional Opacity
The disclosure of 8,630 complaints to Parliament has demonstrated that the CJI’s office receives a substantial number of representations concerning sitting judges.
However, aggregate figures alone do not explain what happens after complaints are received.
If the public knows how many complaints have been received but cannot obtain meaningful information about their examination and disposal, it becomes difficult to assess the effectiveness of the accountability mechanism.
This does not mean that every complaint should be publicly identified or that every inquiry report should be published.
Rather, the question is whether meaningful institutional transparency can be achieved without disclosing sensitive personal information.
For example, an annual report could disclose:
- Total complaints received.
- Number of complaints screened.
- Number of complaints rejected as frivolous or outside the scope of the procedure.
- Number of complaints requiring further examination.
- Number of internal inquiries initiated.
- Number of inquiries completed.
- Broad categories of remedial action taken.
- Average time taken to process complaints.
Such information could be published without automatically identifying the judges or complainants involved.
It would provide the public with a clearer picture of institutional performance while preserving confidentiality where genuinely necessary.
Protecting Honest Judges Against Malicious Complaints
Any discussion about transparency must also recognise the potential harm caused by false or malicious allegations.
Judges exercise considerable authority. Their decisions may affect powerful political, commercial and institutional interests.
There is a genuine possibility that complaints could be filed to intimidate judges, influence pending cases or damage professional reputations.
If every unverified complaint became publicly accessible with the judge’s identity attached, the complaint mechanism itself could be misused.
Consequently, transparency should not mean unrestricted publication of allegations.
A sensible framework could distinguish between the initial receipt of a complaint, preliminary examination, formal inquiry and final institutional findings.
The identity of a judge and the contents of a complaint may require protection during an ongoing preliminary process. However, aggregate statistics and appropriately anonymised information about the functioning of the mechanism could potentially be disclosed.
The objective should be accountability without trial by publicity.
10. Can Citizens Still Seek Information About Complaints Against Judges Through RTI?
The Saurav Das controversy should not discourage citizens from using the RTI Act to seek information concerning judicial administration.
However, applicants should understand that different categories of information may attract different legal considerations.
A carefully drafted RTI application should distinguish between existing administrative records, statistical information, confidential complaint documents and information relating to the outcome of an inquiry.
For example, an applicant interested in institutional transparency could seek:
- The total number of complaints received against sitting judges during a specified financial year or calendar year.
- The number of complaints examined during the relevant period.
- The number of complaints referred for further examination or inquiry.
- The number of complaints disposed of during the relevant period.
- Whether any anonymised annual statistics or consolidated reports concerning the in-house procedure are maintained.
- Copies of existing rules, guidelines or procedures governing the receipt and processing of complaints against judges.
- Copies of existing annual reports or administrative records concerning the functioning of the complaint-handling mechanism, subject to lawful redactions.
- Whether any system of registering and tracking complaints is maintained, without seeking confidential personal information.
These questions focus on the functioning of the institution rather than automatically demanding access to sensitive allegations.
What If the CPIO Refuses the Information?
If a public information officer rejects an RTI application, the applicant should carefully examine the reasons given in the rejection.
Depending on the circumstances, the applicant may consider the following remedies.
First Appeal: Under Section 19(1) of the RTI Act, an applicant can approach the First Appellate Authority within the prescribed period, ordinarily 30 days from the receipt of the decision or expiry of the response period.
Second Appeal: Under Section 19(3), a second appeal can be filed before the appropriate Information Commission within 90 days from the date on which the decision should have been made or was actually received.
Complaint: Section 18 provides a separate complaint mechanism before the appropriate Information Commission in specified circumstances, including certain situations involving refusal to accept or process an RTI request.
It is important to distinguish a second appeal seeking access to information from a complaint concerning the functioning of the RTI mechanism.
Applicants should also remember that Section 7(9) concerns the form of disclosure and is not, by itself, a blanket exemption from providing information.
Where records contain both disclosable and exempt information, Section 10 of the RTI Act concerning severability may also become relevant. It allows access to the non-exempt portion of a record where the exempt material can reasonably be separated.
11. What Reforms Could Improve Transparency in the Judicial Complaint Mechanism?
The controversy provides an opportunity to examine whether India’s existing system requires improvements in record management, reporting and public accountability.
Several possible reforms deserve consideration.
A. A Centralised Complaint-Registration System
A systematic digital registration mechanism could record complaints received against members of the higher judiciary.
Each complaint could receive a unique identification number, with information recorded about its date of receipt, category and administrative status.
Such a system would not necessarily require public disclosure of the judge’s identity.
Its primary purpose would be to ensure that complaints can be tracked internally and that records are not unnecessarily fragmented.
B. Anonymous Statistical Reporting
The Supreme Court and High Courts could consider publishing periodic reports containing anonymised statistics.
These reports could disclose how many complaints were received, examined, investigated and disposed of.
The publication of such information would improve institutional accountability without exposing complainants or judges to unnecessary reputational harm.
C. Clear Classification of Complaints
Not all complaints have the same nature or seriousness.
A structured classification system could distinguish between:
- Administrative grievances.
- Allegations concerning judicial conduct.
- Allegations of corruption.
- Allegations of sexual misconduct.
- Allegations of abuse of authority.
- Complaints involving procedural irregularities.
- Frivolous or unsupported representations.
Proper classification would make aggregate reporting more meaningful.
D. Clear Timelines for Processing Complaints
A transparent mechanism could establish indicative timelines for preliminary examination, further inquiry and disposal.
This would help reduce uncertainty about the progress of complaints.
It would also provide a basis for assessing whether the complaint mechanism operates efficiently.
E. Reasoned Institutional Reporting
Where appropriate, the institution could publish anonymised summaries of final outcomes.
Such summaries would help the public understand whether complaints were rejected, investigated or resulted in remedial action.
The publication of final outcomes would need to comply with applicable confidentiality requirements and protect the rights of individuals involved.
F. A Clear Policy for RTI Disclosure
The judiciary could consider publishing clear guidelines explaining which categories of complaint-related information may be disclosed under the RTI Act and which categories require confidentiality.
This would help public information officers respond consistently to applications.
It could also reduce unnecessary litigation concerning whether basic statistical or administrative information is available.
These are possible institutional reforms, not existing legal obligations established by the Saurav Das proceedings.
12. The Larger Constitutional Question: Judicial Independence Versus the Right to Information
The Indian Constitution does not establish judicial independence as a privilege that places the judiciary beyond public accountability.
Judicial independence is a constitutional safeguard designed to ensure that judges can perform their duties without improper interference.
Similarly, the right to information is an important instrument of democratic accountability.
Both principles serve the constitutional system, although they protect different interests.
The RTI Act recognises that public authorities must provide access to information while allowing specified exemptions to protect privacy, confidentiality and other legitimate interests.
The judiciary must therefore be able to protect genuinely sensitive information without treating every request concerning judicial administration as inherently impermissible.
The Supreme Court’s 2019 Constitution Bench judgment in the Subhash Chandra Agarwal case is particularly relevant because it recognised the applicability of the RTI framework to the CJI’s office while also emphasising the need to balance transparency with privacy and institutional interests.
The present dispute raises a more specific question: How should that balance operate when the requested information concerns complaints alleging corruption or misconduct by judges?
There is no reason to assume that every such complaint must be disclosed in full.
Equally, there is no sufficient basis to assume that every piece of information concerning the receipt or processing of such complaints must automatically remain confidential.
The legal analysis must consider the precise information sought, the applicable statutory exemptions and the public interest involved.
13. What Should Be Watched in the Saurav Das Case?
As of 11 November 2026, the most important immediate development is the Delhi High Court’s order dated 5 November 2026, recording that arguments had been heard and the matter reserved for orders.
The eventual decision could have significance for several issues:
- Whether information concerning the receipt of complaints against a particular judge can be disclosed under the RTI Act.
- Whether the absence of a judge-specific database is sufficient to justify refusing the information requested.
- Whether the RTI applicant can seek inspection of existing records instead of requiring the public authority to prepare a new compilation.
- Whether Section 7(9) can justify refusing a request where the underlying information may already exist in administrative records.
- How Section 8(1)(j), as amended, applies to information concerning allegations of misconduct in the performance of public duties.
- Whether Section 8(1)(e) can protect complaint-related records and, if so, to what extent.
- How the public-interest considerations under Section 8(2) should be balanced against privacy and confidentiality.
- Whether a more structured and transparent mechanism for maintaining complaint-related information is necessary.
The judgment may also help clarify whether aggregate statistical disclosure and judge-specific information should be treated differently under the RTI framework.
Until the Court delivers its decision, these questions should be regarded as unresolved issues rather than settled legal conclusions.
Transparency in the Judiciary Must Protect Both Accountability and Independence
The controversy surrounding Saurav Das v. CPIO, Supreme Court of India raises an important question about the future of transparency in India’s higher judiciary.
The disclosure before Parliament that the CJI’s office received 8,630 complaints against sitting judges between 2016 and 2025 has brought renewed attention to the functioning of the judicial in-house complaint mechanism.
However, the public has not received a corresponding comprehensive account of how those complaints were examined or disposed of.
The Supreme Court administration’s position is that judge-specific information concerning complaints of corruption or misconduct is not maintained in the requested format and that disclosure raises questions of confidentiality, privacy and disproportionate administrative burden.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that allegations concerning the conduct of constitutional office-holders have a significant public-interest dimension and that basic information should not be denied merely because the institution does not maintain it in a customised format.
Both positions raise important legal and institutional considerations.
Judicial independence must be protected. Honest judges must not become victims of politically motivated or malicious complaints. Confidential inquiries must receive appropriate protection.
At the same time, a credible accountability system should be capable of demonstrating that complaints are properly received, examined and dealt with.
The public does not necessarily need access to every confidential document to assess whether an institution is functioning responsibly. Anonymised statistics, transparent procedures, appropriate record management and meaningful reporting of institutional outcomes could provide substantial accountability without compromising legitimate privacy interests.
The question is not whether judges should enjoy privacy or whether citizens should enjoy transparency. Both are important.
The real question is whether India can develop a system in which the independence of the judiciary is protected while the institutional handling of serious allegations remains sufficiently transparent to sustain public confidence.
The outcome of the Saurav Das case could become an important part of that larger constitutional and legal debate.
Legal accuracy note: This article reflects the reported developments and available court records as of 11 November 2026. The Delhi High Court reserved its order on 5 November 2026; no final judgment in the petition has been treated as delivered. The article distinguishes the Supreme Court administration’s submissions from judicial findings and does not treat complaints as proof of misconduct.
