Rules for Me, but Not for Thee? Courts Are Not Above the People: Why India Must Reconsider Criminal Contempt and Protect Freedom of Speech
Can the Judiciary Be Questioned in a Democracy?
A democracy cannot function on the principle that citizens must obey institutions without being allowed to question them. The Constitution of India guarantees citizens the freedom to speak, express opinions, debate public policies, criticise government decisions and challenge the actions of constitutional institutions. The judiciary, despite its essential position in the constitutional structure, cannot be an exception to the democratic principle of accountability.
Courts deserve respect, but respect cannot mean immunity from criticism. Judges deserve independence, but judicial independence cannot become institutional insulation from public scrutiny. Judicial orders must be obeyed unless they are stayed, modified or set aside by a competent court. However, judicial decisions, legal reasoning, judicial conduct and the functioning of the justice system must remain open to informed public discussion.
This distinction raises an important constitutional question: Why should the law punish someone for deliberately disobeying a court order and, under a separate category of criminal contempt, potentially punish someone for speech alleged to undermine the authority or reputation of a court?
The controversy centres on Section 2(c)(i) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which criminalises publications or acts that scandalise, or tend to scandalise, a court or lower, or tend to lower, its authority. It also concerns Article 19(2) of the Constitution, which expressly recognises contempt of court as a permissible ground for imposing reasonable restrictions on freedom of speech and expression.
The case for reform is not an argument against the judiciary. It is an argument for a judiciary whose legitimacy rests on constitutional integrity, sound reasoning, institutional transparency and public confidence rather than protection from uncomfortable criticism.
The central proposition is straightforward: Disobeying a lawful court order and criticising a judicial decision are fundamentally different activities. The law must not blur that distinction.
1. Understanding the Constitutional Right to Freedom of Speech
Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution guarantees every citizen the right to freedom of speech and expression.
This freedom is one of the foundations of representative democracy. It allows citizens to question those who exercise public power, discuss controversial judgments, expose institutional failures, challenge government policies and participate in national debates.
However, this right is not absolute.
Article 19(2) permits the State to impose reasonable restrictions on freedom of speech and expression in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation and incitement to an offence.
The expression “contempt of court” is therefore explicitly included among the constitutional grounds for restricting speech.
The question is not whether courts should be protected from genuine obstruction. The question is whether the constitutional exception should continue to encompass the broad and potentially ambiguous concept of scandalising the judiciary.
A citizen who disagrees with a Supreme Court judgment should be able to explain why the reasoning is flawed. A constitutional scholar should be able to question the interpretation of a fundamental right. A journalist should be able to investigate institutional failures. A lawyer should be able to argue that a judicial interpretation has produced an unjust outcome.
These activities are part of democratic constitutional discourse.
The Constitution does not establish a system in which judges are the only people entitled to interpret the significance of their judgments for public debate. Courts decide legal disputes through their constitutional authority, but citizens retain the right to discuss the consequences of those decisions.
2. What Does Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 Actually Say?
The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 distinguishes between civil contempt and criminal contempt.
Section 2(b) defines civil contempt as wilful disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court, or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court.
In simple terms, deliberately refusing to comply with a binding court order can constitute civil contempt.
Section 2(c), on the other hand, defines criminal contempt through three broad categories.
First, publication or conduct that scandalises or tends to scandalise a court, or lowers or tends to lower its authority.
Second, publication or conduct that prejudices or interferes, or tends to interfere, with the due course of a judicial proceeding.
Third, conduct that interferes or obstructs, or tends to interfere or obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner.
The first category is the most controversial from the perspective of freedom of expression.
There is an important difference between obstructing justice and damaging an institution’s reputation through criticism.
For example, intimidating a witness, deliberately interfering with a pending trial, threatening a judge to influence a decision or attempting to prevent the implementation of a judicial order can directly threaten the administration of justice.
By contrast, arguing that a judgment is constitutionally incorrect, questioning a court’s interpretation of a statute, criticising judicial reasoning or demanding institutional reforms does not automatically obstruct the administration of justice.
Yet Section 2(c)(i) introduces the concept of scandalising the court, which creates a difficult boundary between permissible criticism and punishable expression.
The concern is that the boundary can become dependent on judicial interpretation of what lowers institutional authority rather than a demonstrable interference with the actual administration of justice.
That is where the debate about reform becomes particularly important.
3. Civil Contempt and Criminal Contempt Must Not Be Confused
The distinction between civil and criminal contempt is central to this entire debate.
Civil contempt is concerned with compliance with judicial authority. If a court issues a lawful direction and a person wilfully disobeys it, the court must have the ability to enforce its decision.
Without enforceable judicial orders, constitutional remedies would become ineffective. A person who wins a case but cannot secure implementation of the judgment would have little reason to trust the justice system.
Therefore, retaining effective powers to address wilful disobedience of court orders is essential.
Criminal contempt is different because it also reaches conduct and publications that allegedly undermine judicial authority or interfere with judicial proceedings.
The second and third categories of Section 2(c), dealing with interference with proceedings and obstruction of justice, address identifiable threats to the administration of justice.
The first category, however, concerns scandalising or lowering the authority of a court.
The distinction matters because an institution’s authority should not be confused with its reputation for being beyond criticism.
A court can retain its legal authority even when citizens strongly disagree with its judgments. Its orders remain binding because of the Constitution and the legal system, not because every citizen must approve of its reasoning.
A person may believe that a judgment is discriminatory, legally unsound, inconsistent with constitutional morality or harmful to a particular section of society. Expressing such a belief, with supporting arguments, is not equivalent to refusing to obey the judgment.
The law should preserve that distinction with clarity.
4. Courts Are Constitutional Institutions, Not Institutions Above Constitutional Accountability
The judiciary occupies a unique position in India’s constitutional framework.
It protects fundamental rights, interprets legislation, reviews executive action and resolves disputes between individuals, institutions and governments.
Judicial independence is indispensable because judges must be able to decide cases without fear of political pressure, public intimidation or retaliation.
However, judicial independence does not mean judicial infallibility.
Judges are human beings. They interpret laws, assess evidence, evaluate competing arguments and make decisions within the limitations of legal reasoning and available information.
Different benches can reach different conclusions. Courts can overrule earlier judgments. Constitutional interpretations can evolve. Legal principles that were once accepted can later be reconsidered.
This is precisely why judicial review, appeals, review petitions, curative petitions and legislative reform exist.
If judicial decisions were beyond questioning, there would be little purpose in maintaining appellate mechanisms.
The same democratic logic applies to public discussion.
Citizens should be able to ask whether a judgment has correctly interpreted the Constitution, whether a legal principle has been applied consistently, whether a court has adequately considered the rights of affected communities and whether the reasoning is persuasive.
Such questions do not destroy judicial independence. They are part of the public conversation surrounding constitutional government.
The authority of a court must ultimately come from the constitutional legitimacy of its decisions and the public’s confidence in the justice system.
That confidence cannot be permanently secured through restrictions on criticism.
5. The Dangerous Ambiguity of the Expression “Scandalising the Court”
One of the strongest arguments for reconsidering Section 2(c)(i) is the breadth of the expression “scandalises or tends to scandalise.”
The provision does not simply prohibit threats, intimidation, bribery, witness tampering or deliberate interference with judicial proceedings.
It also uses language that can bring criticism of the judiciary within the scope of criminal contempt.
The difficulty is determining when criticism becomes scandalising.
Consider the following examples:
A lawyer argues that a Supreme Court judgment has misinterpreted a constitutional provision.
A journalist writes that a particular judicial decision has weakened fundamental rights.
A constitutional expert argues that a court has adopted an inconsistent legal standard.
A citizen questions whether a judicial institution is sufficiently transparent.
An organisation campaigns for changes to judicial appointments or accountability mechanisms.
These are legitimate subjects of democratic discussion.
Now consider a different category of conduct: a person threatens a judge, intimidates witnesses, fabricates evidence to derail proceedings or deliberately obstructs the implementation of a court order.
These actions can interfere with the administration of justice and warrant legal intervention.
The problem arises when the distinction between the two categories becomes blurred.
If citizens cannot confidently determine whether a strongly worded criticism of a judgment will be treated as protected expression or criminal contempt, the law may discourage legitimate debate.
This can create a chilling effect.
People may choose silence rather than risk legal proceedings, even when their criticism is based on evidence, constitutional principles or genuine public interest.
A democracy should be particularly cautious about laws that can discourage citizens, journalists, researchers and lawyers from discussing the functioning of public institutions.
6. The Supreme Court Has Recognised That Healthy Criticism Is Not Contempt
Importantly, Indian judicial precedents themselves recognise that criticism of judicial decisions is not automatically contempt.
In P.N. Duda v. V.P. Shiv Shankar (1988), the Supreme Court considered a contempt petition arising from a speech by the then Union Law Minister, V.P. Shiv Shankar, concerning the functioning of the judiciary.
The case is significant because it recognised the importance of reading public criticism in its proper context rather than treating every critical statement about the judiciary as an attack on the institution.
The judgment helped establish an important principle: the judiciary must remain open to fair public criticism.
In In Re: Arundhati Roy (2002), the Supreme Court discussed the distinction between fair criticism and statements that cross the threshold of criminal contempt. It recognised that fair criticism of judicial conduct, the institution and its functioning, made in good faith and public interest, may not amount to contempt.
The distinction is important, although the Court also maintained that criticism which crosses into scandalising the institution may attract contempt jurisdiction.
Another significant development came in In Re: Prashant Bhushan (2020), where the Supreme Court reiterated that healthy and constructive criticism of judgments cannot amount to contempt of court. At the same time, it maintained that allegations going beyond criticism and scandalising the Court could attract criminal contempt.
These decisions demonstrate that the law already recognises the legitimacy of judicial criticism.
However, they also expose the central difficulty: if healthy criticism is protected, why should the law retain a provision whose language makes the boundary between criticism and scandalising the court a continuing subject of judicial interpretation?
A more clearly defined legal framework could protect the administration of justice without making institutional reputation an independent basis for restricting speech.
7. The Law Commission of India Examined This Exact Question
The debate over criminal contempt is not merely an academic argument or a social media controversy. The Government of India itself referred the question to the Law Commission of India.
In 2018, the Law Commission submitted its 274th Report, titled “Review of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.”
The Department of Justice had specifically asked the Commission to examine whether the definition of contempt should be restricted to wilful disobedience of court directions and judgments.
In other words, the Commission was asked to consider whether contempt law should be narrowed to focus on disobedience rather than retaining the existing broader definition of criminal contempt.
The Commission examined constitutional provisions, judicial decisions and international legal developments.
However, it did not recommend abolishing criminal contempt.
Its reasoning deserves serious consideration.
The Commission argued that the Supreme Court and High Courts derive constitutional powers to punish for contempt from Articles 129 and 215, respectively. Consequently, deleting the statutory definition of criminal contempt would not automatically remove the constitutional contempt jurisdiction of these courts.
It also expressed concern that narrowing the statutory definition could leave subordinate courts without adequate protection against certain forms of contempt.
Another concern was that eliminating the statutory definition might create uncertainty because superior courts would continue to exercise their constitutional powers.
The Commission therefore recommended retaining the existing definition.
This is an important counterargument to the proposed reform. It demonstrates that simply deleting Section 2(c)(i) may not be sufficient to achieve the intended constitutional outcome.
Any serious reform must examine the relationship between the Contempt of Courts Act and the constitutional powers of the Supreme Court and High Courts.
The debate must therefore address both statutory reform and constitutional reform.
8. Article 19(2): Why Should Contempt of Court Remain a Separate Exception to Free Speech?
The proposed amendment to Article 19(2) raises a more fundamental constitutional question.
Why should contempt of court be separately mentioned as a ground for restricting freedom of expression when other legal principles can address genuine interference with judicial proceedings?
For example, threats, intimidation, defamation, obstruction of justice, witness tampering and interference with pending trials can be addressed through appropriately defined laws.
The existence of a separate constitutional exception for contempt creates an additional legal basis for restricting speech.
Removing the expression “contempt of court” from Article 19(2) would therefore be a way of reconsidering the constitutional balance between judicial authority and freedom of expression.
The argument is not that every statement about a judge must be protected regardless of its nature or consequences.
Nor is it an argument that individuals should be permitted to threaten judges, intimidate witnesses or sabotage judicial proceedings.
Rather, the objective would be to ensure that criticism of judicial decisions, judicial reasoning and institutional functioning is not restricted merely because it is considered damaging to the reputation or authority of a court.
A constitutional democracy should distinguish between protecting the process of justice and protecting an institution from embarrassment.
These are not the same objective.
If the Constitution is amended to remove contempt of court as a separate exception under Article 19(2), Parliament would still retain the ability to enact appropriately tailored laws addressing genuine interference with the administration of justice under other constitutionally permissible grounds.
However, such an amendment would need careful drafting. The removal of the specific exception would not automatically invalidate every existing contempt provision, because the constitutional powers under Articles 129 and 215 would remain relevant.
That is why the proposed constitutional amendment and statutory repeal must be considered together.
9. The International Experience: England and Wales Abolished Scandalising the Judiciary
The argument for reform also has an important international dimension.
India inherited much of its traditional contempt jurisprudence from English common law.
Historically, the doctrine of scandalising the court developed in England as a mechanism to protect public confidence in the administration of justice.
However, the legal position eventually changed.
The United Kingdom’s Law Commission examined the offence and recommended its abolition.
In 2013, Section 33 of the Crime and Courts Act abolished scandalising the judiciary as a form of contempt of court under the common law of England and Wales.
This development is particularly relevant to India because it demonstrates that a legal system can abolish the offence of scandalising the judiciary without abandoning the protection of judicial proceedings.
The distinction is between criticism of the institution and conduct that genuinely obstructs justice.
England and Wales retained other contempt mechanisms to address interference with judicial proceedings and the administration of justice.
This example does not establish that India must automatically adopt the same approach. India’s constitutional structure, statutory framework and judicial powers are different.
Nevertheless, it demonstrates that protecting courts and criminalising criticism of courts are not necessarily inseparable objectives.
India can examine whether its contempt framework needs to evolve in accordance with contemporary democratic expectations.
10. The Strongest Argument for Retaining Criminal Contempt
A balanced constitutional debate must also address why criminal contempt exists in the first place.
Courts do not possess independent enforcement machinery comparable to the executive branch. Their authority depends substantially on the ability to conduct proceedings, protect participants and ensure that judicial decisions are respected.
Judges must be protected from intimidation. Witnesses must be protected from threats. Parties must be able to approach courts without facing coercion. Pending trials must not be deliberately manipulated through publications or other interference.
Moreover, public confidence in the judiciary is important because the judicial system is responsible for resolving disputes peacefully through the rule of law.
The argument advanced in favour of retaining criminal contempt is that persistent, baseless and malicious allegations against judges could undermine confidence in the justice system and weaken the ability of courts to function independently.
The Law Commission of India’s 274th Report relied substantially on these concerns.
There is also a constitutional consideration: Articles 129 and 215 recognise the contempt powers of the Supreme Court and High Courts.
Therefore, any reform must ensure that the judiciary does not lose the ability to protect the actual administration of justice.
But the existence of these legitimate concerns does not necessarily settle whether the offence of scandalising a court should continue.
The real question is whether protecting justice requires protecting judicial reputation through criminal punishment.
A judicial institution should be able to answer criticism through its judgments, transparency, institutional accountability and consistent application of the law.
It should not need protection from every expression that questions its performance.
11. The Risk of a Chilling Effect on Journalists, Lawyers and Ordinary Citizens
Freedom of speech has little practical value if people are too afraid to exercise it.
Journalists investigate public institutions. Lawyers challenge legal interpretations. Academics examine constitutional principles. Civil society organisations campaign for reforms. Citizens discuss judgments that affect their rights and everyday lives.
All these activities require the freedom to express disagreement.
A broadly worded criminal provision can discourage such participation even when a prosecution does not ultimately result in punishment.
The process itself can impose costs.
A person facing contempt proceedings may have to arrange legal representation, attend court hearings, defend their statements and spend considerable time and resources responding to allegations.
This possibility can discourage others from raising similar questions.
The concern is particularly significant when criticism concerns a matter of considerable public importance.
For example, citizens should be able to debate:
- Whether a particular judgment adequately protects fundamental rights.
- Whether bail decisions follow consistent legal principles.
- Whether delays in judicial proceedings undermine access to justice.
- Whether judicial appointments require greater transparency.
- Whether courts have adequately addressed questions involving equality and discrimination.
- Whether judicial institutions need stronger accountability mechanisms.
- Whether a particular interpretation of constitutional law has produced unintended consequences.
These subjects are not outside democratic discussion simply because they concern the judiciary.
The ability to question institutions is particularly important when those institutions exercise powers that directly affect the rights and liberties of citizens.
A free society should not require citizens to praise judicial decisions before they are allowed to discuss them.
12. The Question of Institutional Accountability
There is another important issue that the contempt debate brings into focus: institutional accountability.
The judiciary exercises enormous constitutional power. Its decisions can determine personal liberty, property rights, government policy, electoral disputes, individual freedoms and the validity of legislation.
Such power requires independence, but independence must operate alongside accountability.
Judicial accountability does not mean allowing politicians or public opinion to dictate the outcome of cases.
It means ensuring that judicial institutions remain subject to appropriate standards of transparency, ethical conduct, reasoned decision-making and constitutional responsibility.
The constitutional framework already contains mechanisms such as appeals, reviews, judicial removal procedures and legislative oversight within defined limits.
However, citizens also have a role in examining the performance of institutions through public discussion.
If judicial decisions are public documents and the reasoning behind them is available for examination, citizens must be able to discuss whether that reasoning is convincing.
If a judgment affects millions of people, the public should be able to debate its implications.
If a legal interpretation creates controversy, constitutional scholars and journalists should be able to examine it.
The judiciary cannot simultaneously exercise constitutional authority over the public and expect to remain outside legitimate public scrutiny.
The purpose of judicial independence is to protect impartial justice, not to create immunity from informed criticism.
13. The December 2025 Kerala High Court Decision: The Debate Remains Alive
The constitutional challenge to criminal contempt has continued to reach Indian courts.
An important development occurred on 18 December 2025, when the Kerala High Court decided Mathews J. Nedumpara v. Union of India, W.P.(C) No. 14564 of 2016.
The petitioner challenged the constitutional validity of Section 2(c)(i), among other provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, arguing that criminalising speech that scandalises or lowers the authority of a court violates Article 19(1)(a).
The Union of India opposed the challenge, maintaining that freedom of expression is subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2).
The Kerala High Court dismissed the petition.
The Court relied on existing Supreme Court precedents, including E.M. Sankaran Namboodiripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar and In Re: Arundhati Roy, to hold that the constitutional validity of contempt law had already been recognised in earlier judicial decisions.
The judgment also referred to statutory safeguards under Sections 3 to 8 of the 1971 Act, including protections for fair and accurate reporting of judicial proceedings and fair criticism of judicial acts.
This decision is important because it demonstrates that the existing legal position remains in force.
However, a High Court’s rejection of a constitutional challenge does not prevent Parliament from considering legislative reform or the Constitution from being amended through the prescribed constitutional process.
The judgment also reinforces the need to distinguish between what the law currently permits and what constitutional reform advocates propose.
As of November 2026, Section 2(c)(i) and the reference to contempt of court in Article 19(2) remain part of India’s legal framework.
14. What Exactly Should Be Repealed or Amended?
The reform proposal requires two distinct but coordinated changes.
First: Repeal Section 2(c)(i) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
The offence of scandalising or lowering the authority of a court should be removed as an independent category of criminal contempt.
This would protect legitimate criticism of judicial decisions, judicial reasoning and institutional functioning from being treated as criminal merely because it is considered damaging to judicial reputation.
However, Sections 2(c)(ii) and 2(c)(iii) could be retained in appropriately narrowed and clearly defined forms to address actual interference with judicial proceedings and the administration of justice.
The law should focus on demonstrable interference, rather than the mere expression of disagreement or criticism.
Second: Amend Article 19(2) of the Constitution.
The words “in relation to contempt of court” should be removed from Article 19(2).
This would require a constitutional amendment under Article 368.
The purpose would be to prevent contempt of court from operating as a separate constitutional ground for restricting freedom of expression.
Such an amendment must be carefully drafted to account for the continuing constitutional powers of the Supreme Court and High Courts under Articles 129 and 215.
Simply deleting Section 2(c)(i) would not automatically eliminate every form of criminal contempt because the superior courts possess constitutional contempt powers independent of the statutory definition.
Similarly, removing the words from Article 19(2) would not, by itself, settle the entire question of how Articles 129 and 215 should operate.
Therefore, Parliament must consider a comprehensive constitutional and statutory reform rather than an isolated deletion.
15. A Practical Alternative: Protect Justice, Not Institutional Reputation
There is a possible middle ground that addresses the legitimate concerns of both sides.
India does not have to choose between unlimited speech and unrestricted contempt powers.
A reformed legal framework could establish the following principles:
1. Criticism of judgments must remain protected.
Citizens should be able to disagree with judicial decisions, question legal interpretations and discuss the social consequences of judgments.
2. Judicial conduct should remain open to fair scrutiny.
Good-faith allegations supported by evidence and raised in public interest should not automatically attract criminal contempt.
3. Deliberate obstruction of justice must remain punishable.
Threatening witnesses, intimidating judges, interfering with proceedings and deliberately obstructing the administration of justice should continue to attract appropriate legal consequences.
4. Wilful disobedience of judicial orders must remain enforceable.
Civil contempt should continue to protect the effectiveness of judicial remedies.
5. The law should require demonstrable interference.
Criminal contempt provisions should have clearly defined elements, with a meaningful requirement of substantial interference or a real and demonstrable threat to the administration of justice.
6. Good-faith public-interest discussion must receive meaningful protection.
Journalism, academic research, legal commentary and public debate should not become grounds for prosecution simply because they question the judiciary.
7. Contempt powers must be exercised with restraint.
Proceedings should not become a substitute for responding to criticism. Clear procedural safeguards and reasoned decisions are essential.
These reforms would preserve the ability of courts to protect judicial proceedings while strengthening the constitutional space available for public debate.
16. The Larger Democratic Principle: Public Institutions Must Be Open to Public Questions
A fundamental feature of democracy is that public institutions derive their legitimacy from the Constitution and the people.
The judiciary is not elected in the same manner as Parliament or State Legislatures. Its legitimacy comes from constitutional authority, independence, impartiality and the faithful administration of justice.
That makes public confidence particularly important.
However, public confidence cannot be created by requiring public silence.
It is strengthened when citizens see that institutions can withstand criticism, acknowledge legitimate concerns, correct errors through established procedures and explain their decisions through transparent legal reasoning.
Consider the relationship between Parliament and the judiciary.
Parliament can debate judicial decisions and enact legislation within constitutional limits. The judiciary can review legislation and invalidate laws that violate the Constitution.
Neither institution is above the Constitution.
Similarly, citizens must retain the ability to question both legislative and judicial decisions.
A constitutional democracy cannot operate on the assumption that criticism of one institution is inherently dangerous while criticism of another is an essential democratic right.
The standard should be consistent: legitimate criticism must be protected, while conduct that genuinely threatens the administration of justice may be regulated through clearly defined laws.
The judiciary must remain independent from political interference, but it must also remain connected to the constitutional values and democratic principles that give it authority.
17. The Fundamental Question: Who Protects the People’s Right to Question Power?
The judiciary is one of the most important protectors of fundamental rights.
Citizens approach courts when governments violate constitutional guarantees, when executive authorities exceed their powers, when individuals face injustice and when legal remedies are denied.
The judiciary therefore occupies a position of immense public responsibility.
But a question naturally follows: If citizens cannot freely discuss whether judicial institutions are performing their constitutional responsibilities effectively, how can meaningful public accountability develop?
The answer cannot be that citizens should simply trust every institution without question.
Trust is important, but informed trust is different from unquestioning acceptance.
The right to disagree with a judgment is not a rejection of the judicial system.
The right to question a legal interpretation is not an attack on the Constitution.
The right to demand judicial reforms is not an attempt to undermine judicial independence.
And the right to criticise institutional functioning is not the same as the right to obstruct justice.
These distinctions must remain at the centre of India’s constitutional debate.
A court’s authority to decide a case must not be confused with an unlimited entitlement to protection from public disagreement.
Respect for Courts Must Come From Justice, Not Fear
The debate surrounding Section 2(c)(i) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and the inclusion of contempt of court in Article 19(2) is ultimately a debate about the relationship between institutional authority and individual liberty.
There is no question that courts must be able to enforce their orders. Without the power to address wilful disobedience, judicial remedies would lose much of their practical value.
There is equally no question that judges and witnesses must be protected from intimidation and that judicial proceedings must be safeguarded against deliberate obstruction.
But these legitimate objectives do not automatically establish the necessity of criminalising speech that allegedly scandalises or lowers the authority of a court.
A citizen who refuses to comply with a binding judicial order and a citizen who publicly argues that the order is legally incorrect are not engaged in the same activity.
One concerns compliance with judicial authority. The other concerns the exercise of constitutional freedom.
India must preserve this distinction.
Section 2(c)(i) deserves serious reconsideration because the language of scandalising the court can place legitimate criticism within the scope of criminal contempt. Article 19(2) also deserves reconsideration because the separate constitutional exception for contempt of court raises questions about the appropriate limits of restrictions on democratic expression.
The Law Commission’s concerns, the constitutional powers under Articles 129 and 215, and the legitimate need to protect the administration of justice must all be addressed before any reform is implemented.
But these considerations should lead to a carefully designed reform framework, not an assumption that every existing restriction must remain unchanged indefinitely.
The strength of a constitutional institution is not measured by how effectively it prevents people from criticising it. It is measured by how faithfully it performs its constitutional responsibilities, how fairly it exercises its powers and how confidently it responds to legitimate public scrutiny.
Courts must have the authority to enforce the law. Citizens must have the freedom to debate the law.
Courts must be protected from obstruction. Citizens must be protected from unnecessary restrictions on expression.
Judicial independence and freedom of speech are not enemies. Both are essential components of constitutional democracy.
The judiciary deserves respect, but respect must never become a demand for unquestioning silence.
A court can command obedience to its lawful orders, but it should not demand intellectual agreement with its judgments. In a democracy, the right to question power is not an act of contempt. It is an essential expression of citizenship.
Rules for me, but not for thee? The Constitution should have one democratic standard for every institution: authority must be respected, but power must remain open to scrutiny.
