The Supreme Court, the Election Commission and the Crisis of Constitutional Credibility: Has the Judiciary Failed Its Democratic Responsibility?

The Supreme Court, the Election Commission and the Crisis of Constitutional Credibility: Has the Judiciary Failed Its Democratic Responsibility? When the Guardian of the Constitution Becomes the Subject of Constitutional…

The Supreme Court, the Election Commission and the Crisis of Constitutional Credibility: Has the Judiciary Failed Its Democratic Responsibility?

When the Guardian of the Constitution Becomes the Subject of Constitutional Questions

The credibility of a constitutional institution does not rest merely on its authority, historical reputation or position within the democratic framework. It rests on its willingness to exercise that authority independently, fearlessly and consistently with the Constitution.

In India, the Supreme Court occupies a particularly important position. It is entrusted with protecting fundamental rights, interpreting the Constitution, reviewing the legality of legislative and executive actions, and ensuring that no institution operates beyond its constitutional limits.

The Election Commission of India (ECI), meanwhile, is responsible for protecting the integrity of the electoral process. Its independence is essential because free and fair elections are the foundation of representative democracy.

However, serious constitutional questions have emerged following the Supreme Court’s decision of 27 May 2026 in Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, concerning the Election Commission’s authority to conduct the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls.

The judgment upheld the Election Commission’s authority to conduct the exercise in Bihar. The Court concluded that the revision was legally authorised, pursued a legitimate constitutional objective, satisfied proportionality requirements and contained sufficient procedural safeguards.

Yet the legal validity of an administrative exercise and the democratic consequences of its implementation are not necessarily identical questions.

Critics have argued that the Court did not adequately address the dangers of mass voter exclusion, the difficulties faced by vulnerable citizens in producing documents, and the consequences of allowing electoral authorities substantial discretion over the composition of electoral rolls.

This controversy raises a question that goes beyond the Election Commission:

If the Supreme Court does not intervene effectively when fundamental democratic rights are potentially threatened, how can citizens maintain confidence in its role as the ultimate constitutional guardian?

The issue deserves serious examination, without assuming that disagreement with a judgment automatically establishes judicial misconduct or constitutional illegality.

1. The Supreme Court’s Constitutional Responsibility Is Greater Than Its Institutional Authority

The Supreme Court is not simply another government institution. Its constitutional responsibility is to ensure that the Constitution remains supreme over Parliament, the executive and every other public authority.

Articles 13, 32, 136, 141 and 142, among other provisions, form important parts of the constitutional framework governing the Court’s authority.

Article 13 establishes that laws inconsistent with fundamental rights are void to the extent of their inconsistency.

Article 32 guarantees the right to approach the Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights.

Article 136 provides the Court with special leave appellate jurisdiction.

Article 141 makes the law declared by the Supreme Court binding on all courts within India.

Article 142 empowers the Court to pass orders necessary to do complete justice in matters before it.

These powers are not unlimited. They must be exercised within constitutional boundaries. Nevertheless, they provide the judiciary with substantial authority to prevent unconstitutional government action.

The Supreme Court’s responsibility becomes particularly significant when government decisions affect political participation, equality before the law, personal liberty and democratic representation.

A constitutional court cannot measure its success merely by the number of judgments it delivers. It must also be assessed by whether its interventions provide meaningful protection when constitutional rights are at risk.

2. The Special Intensive Revision: Why the Controversy Matters

The Special Intensive Revision is an exercise undertaken by the Election Commission to examine, update and verify electoral rolls.

Its stated objectives include:

  • Removing duplicate electoral entries.
  • Removing the names of deceased persons.
  • Correcting entries of people who have permanently shifted.
  • Identifying individuals who are legally ineligible to vote.
  • Ensuring that eligible Indian citizens are included in electoral rolls.

These are legitimate administrative objectives. An accurate electoral roll is necessary for free and fair elections.

However, the controversy concerns the manner in which these objectives are pursued.

In Bihar, the Election Commission initiated the SIR in June 2025. The exercise required electors to participate in a verification process, with additional documentation requirements for certain categories of voters.

The process generated significant concerns because millions of existing electoral entries were affected.

Approximately 65 lakh names were excluded from the draft electoral roll published on 1 August 2025. The final electoral roll contained approximately 7.42 crore electors, compared with approximately 7.89 crore before the exercise.

These figures do not establish that every excluded individual was eligible to vote. Equally, they do not establish that every exclusion was justified.

That distinction is fundamental.

An electoral revision must protect against two opposite dangers: allowing ineligible individuals to remain on the electoral roll and excluding eligible citizens from their constitutional right to participate in elections.

The second danger is particularly serious because an eligible citizen who is wrongly excluded loses the opportunity to participate in choosing representatives.

The integrity of elections therefore cannot be measured solely by how many names are removed. It must also be measured by how effectively eligible citizens are protected against wrongful exclusion.

3. The Supreme Court’s Decision: What Exactly Did It Uphold?

On 27 May 2026, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment in Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, reported as 2026 INSC 564.

The Court considered several important questions:

  1. Whether the Election Commission possessed the legal authority to conduct the SIR.
  2. Whether the exercise pursued a legitimate constitutional objective.
  3. Whether its procedures were proportionate and consistent with electoral legislation.
  4. Whether the Election Commission could conduct a limited inquiry into citizenship eligibility for electoral registration.

The Court upheld the exercise.

It interpreted Article 324 of the Constitution alongside Section 21(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950.

Section 21(3) permits the Election Commission to direct a special revision of electoral rolls for reasons to be recorded and in the manner it considers appropriate, subject to the applicable constitutional and statutory framework.

The Court reasoned that Article 324 and Article 327 are complementary provisions. Parliament’s legislative authority over elections does not eliminate the Election Commission’s constitutional responsibilities.

The judgment also recognised the Election Commission’s authority to conduct a limited administrative inquiry into citizenship for the purpose of electoral eligibility. Such an inquiry, the Court clarified, is not equivalent to a formal determination of citizenship under the Citizenship Act.

The Court concluded that the SIR had a legitimate purpose and that the procedure adopted was not constitutionally disproportionate.

This is the actual legal position established by the judgment.

However, an important question remains: does recognising an institution’s legal authority necessarily resolve every constitutional concern regarding how that authority is exercised?

It does not.

The existence of power and the constitutionality of its particular exercise are separate questions. Even a constitutionally authorised institution must remain accountable for arbitrary, discriminatory or procedurally unfair actions.

4. The Central Constitutional Concern: The Right to Vote and the Right Not to Be Wrongfully Excluded

The right to vote occupies a distinctive position in Indian constitutional law.

Article 326 provides for elections to the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies on the basis of adult suffrage, subject to constitutionally permitted disqualifications.

It requires that every Indian citizen who meets the applicable age requirement and is not otherwise disqualified under the Constitution or relevant legislation be entitled to registration as an elector.

It is important to distinguish the constitutional right to participate in elections from the statutory framework governing registration and voting. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognised that the right to vote is principally a statutory right, although the electoral process operates within the larger constitutional framework of democratic government.

Nevertheless, the constitutional importance of adult suffrage cannot be underestimated.

If a person satisfies the legal requirements for registration but is excluded because of an administrative error, an inaccessible documentation requirement or an unfair verification process, that exclusion deserves effective legal scrutiny.

A person should not lose the opportunity to participate in democracy merely because they cannot easily produce a particular document.

This concern becomes particularly relevant for:

  • Poor and economically disadvantaged citizens.
  • Migrant workers.
  • Elderly individuals.
  • Persons with disabilities.
  • Women whose documentary records may not reflect changes in residence or family circumstances.
  • Citizens living in remote or poorly connected areas.
  • People whose official records contain spelling mistakes or inconsistent personal details.

A fair electoral verification system must recognise the realities of Indian society.

The constitutional objective should be accurate electoral rolls without creating unnecessary barriers to political participation.

5. Did the Supreme Court Act as an Effective Constitutional Safeguard?

This is arguably the most important question arising from the SIR controversy.

The Supreme Court had an opportunity to examine not only the Election Commission’s legal authority but also the practical consequences of its exercise.

The critics’ principal concern is that the Court’s intervention did not sufficiently resolve the structural risks associated with large-scale voter verification.

One important criticism relates to timing.

The initial challenge to the Bihar SIR was filed before the 2025 Assembly elections. However, the final judgment upholding the exercise came on 27 May 2026, after those elections had concluded.

This raises a serious institutional question: what is the practical value of judicial protection if the Court’s final determination arrives after the electoral event that gave rise to the dispute?

A constitutional challenge concerning voter eligibility is not an ordinary administrative disagreement.

Once an election has taken place, the opportunity to exercise the vote in that election cannot simply be restored through a subsequent judgment.

This does not mean that every electoral dispute must automatically result in an interim stay. Courts must also consider the consequences of interrupting elections and the public interest in electoral continuity.

However, where potentially irreversible constitutional harm is alleged, courts should provide timely consideration of interim protection and reasoned explanations for their decisions.

The distinction between refusing relief after careful consideration and delaying meaningful consideration until the disputed process has been completed is important.

Judicial review must be effective in practice, not merely available in theory.

6. Judicial Credibility: Why Constitutional Institutions Must Remain Open to Criticism

The Supreme Court’s credibility does not arise from the assumption that every judgment must be universally accepted.

Judicial credibility develops through independence, transparency, consistency, impartiality and the willingness to protect constitutional rights even when doing so creates difficulties for powerful institutions.

A controversial judgment does not automatically destroy the legitimacy of a court.

However, repeated public concerns about delayed constitutional adjudication, inadequate examination of fundamental-rights arguments or insufficient scrutiny of executive discretion can create questions about institutional accountability.

The SIR judgment has become part of a wider debate about the Supreme Court’s approach to constitutional disputes.

Legal commentators have raised concerns about what they describe as judicial evasion, executive deference and insufficient engagement with the indirect discriminatory effects of administrative policies.

These are serious criticisms and deserve consideration.

At the same time, the opposing constitutional argument must also be acknowledged.

The Election Commission cannot maintain accurate electoral rolls if every existing entry is permanently immune from verification. The Constitution itself requires electoral registration to comply with citizenship and other statutory eligibility conditions.

The Supreme Court therefore faced two legitimate constitutional objectives:

First, protecting eligible citizens against wrongful exclusion.

Second, maintaining accurate electoral rolls that include only legally eligible electors.

The challenge was to ensure that neither objective undermined the other.

The central debate is whether the safeguards recognised by the Court are sufficiently strong to achieve that balance in actual administrative practice.

7. The Independence of the Election Commission Is Itself a Constitutional Requirement

Another important dimension of this controversy concerns the independence of the Election Commission.

In Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023), the Supreme Court examined the constitutional framework for appointing the Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners.

The judgment recognised the importance of an independent Election Commission as an essential feature of the constitutional democratic framework.

The Court established an interim appointment mechanism involving the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and the Chief Justice of India, pending parliamentary legislation.

Parliament subsequently enacted the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023.

The legislation replaced the interim arrangement with a selection committee consisting of the Prime Minister, a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha.

This development generated further debate about the institutional independence of the Election Commission.

The broader constitutional issue is straightforward: an election authority must be sufficiently independent of the government whose electoral fortunes may be affected by its decisions.

Independence, however, does not mean freedom from accountability.

An independent constitutional institution must remain answerable to the Constitution, applicable legislation and judicial review.

The Supreme Court must therefore examine both sides of the institutional relationship: the protection of the Election Commission against improper political interference and the protection of citizens against arbitrary electoral administration.

Neither principle should be sacrificed for the other.

8. Can the Supreme Court Declare Unconstitutional Laws Void?

A frequently raised argument in this debate is that the Supreme Court should declare unconstitutional laws void rather than allow them to continue operating.

This argument has a substantial constitutional foundation, but its legal application requires precision.

Article 13 is particularly important.

Article 13(1) provides that pre-Constitution laws are void to the extent that they are inconsistent with fundamental rights.

Article 13(2) prohibits the State from making laws that take away or abridge fundamental rights and declares laws made in violation of that prohibition void to the extent of the contravention.

This is the constitutional foundation for judicial review of legislation that violates fundamental rights.

However, Article 13 is not the only basis for constitutional review.

The Supreme Court can also examine whether legislation:

  • Violates other express constitutional provisions.
  • Exceeds the legislative competence of Parliament or a State Legislature.
  • Violates constitutional limitations on government authority.
  • Damages the basic structure of the Constitution through a constitutional amendment.

The basic-structure doctrine originated in the landmark 1973 decision in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala.

The Court held that Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 is extensive but cannot be exercised to destroy or damage the Constitution’s basic structure.

In Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980), the Supreme Court further reinforced the importance of limited amending power and the constitutional balance between fundamental rights and Directive Principles.

These decisions demonstrate that constitutional supremacy is not merely a theoretical principle.

The Supreme Court has the authority and responsibility to invalidate laws that cross constitutional boundaries.

However, it cannot declare every law unconstitutional merely because a litigant, commentator or section of society considers that law unjust, ineffective or undesirable.

The legal question must be whether the law violates the Constitution.

This distinction is essential to preserving judicial independence and constitutional discipline.

9. Should Laws That Produce Unjust Outcomes Be Struck Down?

The demand that the Supreme Court invalidate laws that protect wrongdoing or produce unjust outcomes deserves examination through established constitutional principles.

A law may be challenged if it creates arbitrary classifications, violates equality, discriminates unfairly, restricts liberty without constitutional justification or exceeds the powers of the legislature.

Article 14 guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws.

Article 15 prohibits specified forms of discrimination.

Article 19 protects certain fundamental freedoms, subject to constitutionally permitted restrictions.

Article 21 protects life and personal liberty and has been interpreted to include important requirements of fairness and procedural due process.

These provisions provide the judiciary with powerful tools to examine laws that produce unconstitutional outcomes.

Importantly, a law does not become unconstitutional simply because it benefits a particular individual, institution or category of persons.

The Court must examine its actual language, purpose, operation and constitutional consequences.

Where a law is unconstitutional, the Court can strike it down to the extent of the constitutional violation.

Where only a particular provision is defective, the Court may invalidate that provision rather than unnecessarily striking down an entire legislative framework.

Where a provision can reasonably be interpreted in a constitutionally compliant manner, the Court may consider reading it down.

This approach protects both constitutional rights and legislative stability.

The objective should not be the destruction of laws as an expression of public anger. It should be the elimination of legal provisions that cannot survive constitutional scrutiny.

10. The Danger of Treating Administrative Convenience as More Important Than Constitutional Rights

One of the most important lessons from the SIR controversy is that administrative efficiency cannot automatically override constitutional safeguards.

Governments and constitutional authorities regularly introduce policies intended to improve administration.

Such objectives may include better identification systems, digital databases, verification exercises and more accurate public records.

But administrative convenience is not an independent constitutional justification for imposing unreasonable burdens on citizens.

When an administrative exercise affects access to fundamental rights or democratic participation, the authorities must demonstrate that their procedures are fair, proportionate and legally authorised.

The proportionality principle is particularly relevant.

A measure that pursues a legitimate objective may still be unconstitutional if it imposes excessive restrictions or fails to provide adequate safeguards.

In the electoral context, proportionality requires serious attention to the consequences of exclusion.

The question should not simply be whether the Election Commission can verify electoral eligibility.

It should also be whether the verification process provides sufficient opportunities for genuine voters to establish their eligibility.

A system that removes ineligible entries but also wrongfully excludes eligible citizens requires effective correction mechanisms.

The constitutional standard must protect both accuracy and inclusion.

11. What Should the Supreme Court Do to Restore Public Confidence?

The debate should move beyond institutional accusations and focus on practical constitutional reforms.

There are several measures that deserve serious consideration.

First: Timely adjudication of electoral disputes.

Challenges involving voter registration, electoral eligibility and large-scale exclusions should receive urgent judicial attention, particularly when elections are approaching.

Courts should provide reasoned decisions on interim protection where irreparable harm is alleged.

Second: Stronger protection against wrongful deletion.

Before an eligible elector is removed from an electoral roll, the applicable procedure should provide meaningful notice, an opportunity to respond and a reasoned determination.

The burden of procedural fairness must not be treated as an administrative inconvenience.

Third: Accessible verification procedures.

Citizens should have reasonable opportunities to establish eligibility through legally acceptable documents and alternative verification procedures.

Administrative requirements should take account of poverty, migration, disability, illiteracy and the realities of rural life.

Fourth: Transparent publication of deletion data.

Electoral authorities should publish sufficiently detailed information about exclusions, including legally permissible reasons, so that wrongful deletions can be identified and challenged.

Fifth: Effective appellate remedies.

The right to appeal must be practical and accessible. A remedy that exists only on paper cannot adequately protect a citizen who has been wrongly excluded from the electoral roll.

Sixth: Independent judicial scrutiny.

The Court should examine the implementation of large-scale electoral exercises where credible allegations of systemic arbitrariness or discrimination arise.

Seventh: Institutional accountability.

The Election Commission must be able to perform its constitutional duties independently, while remaining subject to legal and judicial scrutiny.

These measures would strengthen electoral administration without undermining the legitimate constitutional powers of the Election Commission.

12. Why the Supreme Court Must Be More Than a Final Interpreter of Legal Texts

The Supreme Court’s role in a constitutional democracy extends beyond resolving technical disputes about the interpretation of legislation.

Its judgments shape the practical relationship between citizens and the State.

When citizens approach the judiciary alleging that their rights have been violated, they expect an independent examination of the evidence, legal arguments and constitutional consequences.

This expectation becomes particularly important when the dispute involves an institution responsible for determining the composition of the electorate.

The electoral roll is not merely a government database.

It determines who can participate in choosing the government.

Consequently, a dispute over the removal of names from an electoral roll has implications for democratic representation, political equality and public participation.

A constitutional court should examine these consequences carefully.

It must also recognise the constitutional importance of maintaining accurate electoral records.

The proper judicial response is not to automatically invalidate every administrative exercise or to automatically approve every action taken by an independent constitutional authority.

It is to scrutinise the legality, proportionality, fairness and practical impact of the particular action.

The legitimacy of judicial power depends on the quality of this scrutiny.

13. Judicial Review Must Apply to Every Institution Without Exception

No institution should be considered beyond constitutional accountability.

Parliament is subject to constitutional limitations.

The executive is subject to constitutional limitations.

State governments are subject to constitutional limitations.

The Election Commission is subject to constitutional and statutory limitations.

The judiciary itself must operate within the Constitution.

This principle is fundamental to the rule of law.

The Supreme Court cannot demand accountability from other institutions while treating its own constitutional responsibilities as immune from public examination.

Citizens, lawyers, academics, journalists and civil society organisations have a legitimate role in questioning judicial reasoning and discussing the consequences of judgments.

Such criticism is not necessarily an attack on judicial independence.

Indeed, informed constitutional debate can strengthen public understanding of the judiciary.

At the same time, judicial decisions must be criticised through evidence, legal reasoning and constitutional principles rather than unsupported allegations about the motives of individual judges.

A court’s institutional credibility is strengthened when its reasoning can withstand rigorous examination.

Constitutional Authority Must Be Matched by Constitutional Responsibility

The controversy surrounding the Election Commission’s Special Intensive Revision has opened an important debate about the relationship between electoral administration, fundamental rights and judicial review in India.

The Supreme Court’s judgment of 27 May 2026 upheld the Election Commission’s legal authority to conduct the Bihar SIR. It recognised the constitutional importance of accurate electoral rolls and concluded that the exercise satisfied the applicable legal and proportionality requirements.

However, the judgment has not ended the broader constitutional debate.

Questions concerning wrongful voter exclusion, procedural fairness, documentary barriers, institutional independence and timely judicial intervention remain important.

The criticism that the Supreme Court has weakened public confidence through its handling of the controversy is an evaluative argument, not an established legal finding. Nevertheless, it raises an issue that deserves serious attention: constitutional authority carries a corresponding responsibility to protect democratic rights effectively.

The Court should not hesitate to invalidate any law, regulation or administrative action that demonstrably violates the Constitution. Equally, it must not declare a law unconstitutional merely because it is politically controversial or produces an outcome that some citizens consider undesirable.

The Constitution, rather than institutional convenience or political pressure, must remain the governing standard.

India does not need a Supreme Court that automatically supports the Election Commission, nor does it need a Supreme Court that automatically opposes it.

India needs a Supreme Court that independently examines every constitutional question, protects eligible citizens against wrongful exclusion, ensures that public institutions remain within their legal boundaries and delivers meaningful remedies before constitutional injuries become irreversible.

The credibility of the Supreme Court cannot be preserved merely by invoking its status as the highest court in the country.

It must be sustained through the consistent application of constitutional principles.

The Constitution is supreme, not the judiciary, not the government, not Parliament and not the Election Commission. Every institution derives its authority from the Constitution, and every institution must remain accountable to it.

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Ajay Gautam

India's Leading Columnist Ajay Gautam Advocate: Lawyer, Author, Columnist, Poet, and Founder of MediumPulse.com